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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE.
PROFESSOR CHEsTFR G. VERNIEDl AND EMER A. WILCOX.
BIGAMY.
Bryan v. State, Tex. Ct. Cr. App., 139 S. -W. 981. Proof of Prior Mar-
riage. There was proof that defendant had lived with Laura, that they had
children, that they were recognized in the community as man and wife, and
that defendant had stated, both before and after his second marriage that Laura
was his wife. Thereafter he married Minnie in the lifetime of Laura. Held
that while reputation alone is not sufficient proof of marriage to support a
conviction of bigamy, the additional evidence of cohabitation and the admis-
sions of the defendant made the proof sufficient.
CoNsTITuTIoNAL LAW.
State v. Meyers, Or., 117 Pac. 818. Right to be Confronted by Witness.
Defendant had been tried and convicted and the conviction had been set aside.
At the time of the second trial a witness who had testified before was out of
the state, and his attendance could not be procured by the exercise of diligence.
Over defendants's objection, the stenographic report of the testimony of this
witness given at the former trial was read at the new trial. Held, that as
the witness had formerly testified orally in the presence of ,the court and jury
at the first trial, and the defendant at that time had full and fair opportunity
to cross-examine him, he had met the witness face to face, and the report of
the testimony so given could be read.
State v. Parker Distilling Co., Mo., 139 S. W. 453. Interstate Commerce.
A statute required all persons manufacturing, rectifying, or selling intoxi-
cating liquors in the state, except wines or spirits made from grapes or fruits
grown in the state, to take out a license-and pay specified fees. Held that the
statute, by discriminating in favor of wines and spirits made from grapes or
fruits grown in the state, and against the same kind of wines and spirits made
from grapes or fruits grown elsewhere, imposed a burden in the form of
license fees upon interstate commerce. The statute was not aided by the
Wilson act, 26 Stat. 313, U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3177, as that act was not
intended to authorize the enactment of state laws materially interfering with
interstate commerce, but to subject intoxicating liquors brought into a state,
to the same law as applied to domestic liquors.
HOMICIDE.
CRIMINAL INTENT.
State v. Tillotson, Kan.; 117 P.c. 1030. Mistake of Law. In a contest
between the mother and foster mother of a child, the circuit court of Illinois
awarded the custody to the mother, who took the child to Kansas. The foster
mother brought suit in the Kansas court, which decided in favor of the mother
on the ground .that the Illinois judgment was conclusive. Four days later the
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Illinois judgment was reversed. Defendant, acting for the foster mother,
then employed an armed man Nyho forcibly took the child from its mother.
Held that the mother was still entitled to the custody as the Kansas judgment
was in effect. No mistaken view that the reversal of the Illinois judgment
gave the foster mother the right to the custody of the child would protect
defendant. The trial court properly refused to instruct that defendant should
not be convicted if the child was taken under a claim of right, resting upon
reasonable grounds. The defendant was properly convicted of "maliciously,
forcibly or fraudulently" carrying away a child under the age of twelve years.
CRIMINAL LAW.
State v. Lindsay, Ia., 132 N. W. 857. Itstructions-Alibi Evidence. Ac-
cused, having gone from P., to C., on a Sunday afternoon, in an automobile, was
charged with having committed rape on prosecutrix while taking her for a ride.
All of the witnesses who testified as to the hour stated that it was between 5 and
6 o'clock. One witness for defense fixed She time of accused's return to P. at
5 minutes before 6, and prosecutrix, testified that when she saw M., who was
one of the first persons she saw after defendant left her, it had been i5 minutes
or less since defendant returned with her from the ride, and M. fixed that time
at 5.30. P. was a nearby town in the same county as C., and there was no claim
that the distance could not have been traversed by accused in half an hour. Held,
that it was error, under such testimony, to submit the case on the theory that the
defense was alibi. Reversed and remanded. Justices McClain and Deemer dis-
senting.
State v. Sandlin, No. Car., 72 S. E. 203. Issues-Insanity--Subjission.
Appeal from a conviction of murder. Assigned as error that the court per-
mitted the defendant to amend his plea to allege insanity at the trial and then
submitted to the jury the double issue as to the prisoner's insanity at the
trial and as to his guilt. Held, that submission of the double issue was not
error. Affirmed.
Dewberry v. State, Ga., 72 S. E., 282. Questions of Fact. Appeal from a
conviction of violation of the prohibition on the ground that the State's prin-
cipal witness was impeached and that the jury should not have believed him.
Held, "the facts of this case afford this court an opportunity of repeating with
emphasis that in no case will it interfere with the verdict of a jury, where
that verdict it attacked solely on the ground that it is unsupported by credible
evidence. The credibility of witnesses is wisely left by the law of this state
exclusively to the determination of the jury; and this court has frequently held
that it has neither the inclination nor the right 'to interfere with any verdict
which is supported by some evidence, however slight that evidence, and how-
ever apparently unreliable the character of the witnesses who give that evi-
dence." Affirmed."
State v. Brown, Ia., 132 N. W. 862. Right of Accused to Confront Wit-
nesses. Appeal from a conviction of murder in the second degree. It was
assigned as error that the court had permitted to be introduced in evidence
the testimony given by a witness at a former trial who was then out of the
state. Held, that the testimony of a witness who has since died may be given
in evidence and that the reasoning which admits such testimony is quite as
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forceful and applicable where the witness is living but out of the state and
therefore beyond the reach of a subpoena. * Affirmed. Justice Weaver dis-
senting.
State v. Dobbins, Ia., 132 N. W. 805. Evidence-Other Offenses. Facts
stated under Larceny. Held, that where the state claimed that defendant and
others had conspired to defraud persons generally by the same scheme, it was
not error to permit a witness to testify that in August prior to the October
when the transaction in question occurred he had been swindled by the same
parties in the same manner, and that immediately prior thereto he saw de-
fendant in association with the other alleged conspirators, the court having
limited the evidence by an instruction that it could not be considered to prove
a conspiracy, but, if the conspiracy had been otherwise established, it was
admissable on the question of its scope and purpose. judgment below
affirmed.
McKay v. State, Neb. 132 N. W. 741. Facts stand under indictment and
information.
Former Jeopardy. Trial for the commission of a felony under an infor-
mation void upon its face, and, after trial begun, the information is amended
and the trial proceeded with does not amount to placing the defendant in
jeopardy a second time..
Private Counsel for State. Where other statute provides that private
counsel to assist the state prosecutor may be procured only by the county
attorney, under the direction of the district court and such assistant is other-
wise procured it is error to overrule an objection made on behalf of the
accused to his participation in the trial.
DemoMstrative Evidence. Where the evidence clearly established that the
deceased had been murdered it was improper to admit in evidence two shirts
found in the house of decedent stained in- blood.
HoMIcIDE.
State v. Brumo, Ia., 132 N. W. 817. Defenses-Non-fatal Wound. De-
cedent lived nineteen days after receiving a mortal wound.1 The court below
refused to permit evidence to be introduced tending to show that the wound
inflicted by defendant was not necessarily fatal. Held, that sucll refusal was
not error, not being a matter of defense. judgment below affirmed.
State v.-Broucn, Ia., 132 N. W. x62. Presumption of Malice. Appeal from
conviction of murder in second degree. An assignment of error was that.the
state had not shown malice'aforethought. Held, on the killing of a human being,
-when done by the use of a dangerous weapon calculated to produce death, the
presumption is, in the absence of any explanation to the contrary, that such taking
of life was with malice aforethought. Affirmed, justice Weaver dissenting.
. Caughron v. State, Ark., 139 S. W. 315. 'Cause of Death. There was
evidence that as the deceased, who was mounted on a mule, approached, de-
fendant shot 'him; that the mule wheeled about and began to run, with
deceased sitting erect in the saddle, and that defendant then shot him again.
Both wounds were mortal. Held that though the first shot was fired in
necessary self-defense, if the second shot was fired when it was not necessary
738
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for defendant to further defend himself, and it contributed in any manner to
the death of the deceased, defendant was guilty of felonious homicide.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
I McKay v. State, Neb., 132 N. W. 741. Date of Offenise. The accused had
been convicted of murder in the first degree, after being forced-to immediate
trial over his objection on an amended indictment. Held, that an information
is fatally defective if it charges the commission of the offense as subsequent to
the date upon which the information is filed, or on an otherwise impossible date
and that it is error after amending to cure such defect in date to require the
accused over his objections, to immediately proceed to trial, without arraignment
under and plea to the only information filed which stated an offense, without
giving him statutory'time to plead thereto, and before a jury impaneled under a
void information. Reversed and remanded.
Sanders v. State, Ala., App. Ct., 56 So. 69. Clerical Error. An indictment
charged that the defendant killed the deceased with malice "aforethought."
Held, that the word as spelled sounded enough like "aforethought" to be cov-
ered by the doctrine of idem sonans. An ordinary man reading the indictment
would probably not detect the defect, and if he did would know from the
context what word was meant. Neither the court, counsel, defendant nor jury
could have been misled. Grifflth v. State, go Ala. 583, 8 So. 812, in which a
conviction Was reversed because the word was spelled "aforethou" was affirmed
and distinguished on the ground that the sound represented by the letters
"aforethou" is not like any word in the English language; Parker v. State, 114
Ala. 690, 22 So. 791, in which a conviction of burglary was reversed because the
indictment charged that the defendant broke and entered the "dwell house" of
another, was distinguished, as "dwell house" is not idem sonans with "dwelling
house."
Flowers v. State, Ala., App. Ct., 56 So. 98. Clerical Error. An indictment
for murder charged that the killing was with ".palice of forethought." Held,
"of forethought" has the same meaning as "aforethought" and the substitu-
tion has no tendency to mislead or leave in obscurity the meaning sought to
be conveyed, even to a person of ordinary understanding and intelligence.
People v. Spencer, Cal. Ct. App., 117 Pac. IO39. Variance. An informa-
tion charged that the defendant drew a draft on the "National Bank of Com-
merce, doing business in the city of Seattle." The legal name of the bank
was "National Bank of Commerce of Seattle." Held that the variance was
immaterial.
City of St. Louis v. Ringold, Mo., 139 S. W. 186. Pleading Municipal
Ordinances. An information charged defendant with keeping a bawdyhouse
"in violation of an ordinance of the said city entitled an 'ordinance in revision
of the General Ordinances of the City of St. Louis' being general ordinance
No. 22,902, Sec. -, Clause -. Approved March 19, 1907," and concluded
"contrary to the ordinance in such case made and provided." At the trial
section 1518, cl. I of the revised ordinances was received in evidence, over
defendant's objection. Held that. as the information must state all facts neces-
sary to constitute the offense intended to be charged, and the courts do not
take judicial notice of municipal ordinances, the ordinance must be pleaded.
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The reference to the revised ordinances was no more than a reference to the
whole of the book of ordinances of the city. As the specific ordinance relied
on was not identified by title or number, nor were its contents stated, the
information was fatally defective. Hence the conviction was reversed.
State v. Robinson, Mo., 139 S. W. 14o. "Against the Peace. An indict-
ment charging that the defendant was accessory before the fact to the crime
of false registration concluded "against the peace and dignity of the staie."
But the included allegation that the principal registered falsely did not so
conclude. Held that the indictment was sufficient. "In view of the fact that
it is only by force of the Constitution that the antiquated phrase keeps its
place at the end of the indictment or count, we can see no reason for enlarg-
ing the power of its uselessness, especially as we have not been shown any
authority for it."
INSANE PERSONS.
Northfoss v. Welch, Minn., 133 N. W. 82. Punishment-Release-Habeas
Corpus. Appeal from an order remanding petitioner to hospital for insane.
Petitioner was tried in 19o4 for assault and acquitted by the jury on the ground
of insanity. Under the statute then in force he was committed to a state
hospital for insane for safe-keeping and treatment until discharged. A'statute
passed in 19o7 provided that no such person should be liberated except on the
order of the committing court and until the superintendent of the hospital
where he is confined shall certify, in writing, that in his opinion such person is
wholly recovered, and that no person shall be endangered by his discharge.
The superintendent in this case would certify that petitioner was cured but
would not certify that no person would be endangered in the future by his
release. Held, that the statute of i9o7 does not apply to commitments prior to
its passage and that in cases where the superintendent refuses to discharge
such persons, habeas corpus is a proper remedy. Reversed, with directions to
discharge the petitioner.
JURY.
State v. Harmon, 84 Kas. 137; 113 Pac. 418. Prior Service in Similar and
Related Cause Harmless Error. The defendant was convicted of statutory
rape and the court while holding that the jury was improperly empanelled by
reason of the fact that a number of the jurors had just sat upon a companion
case involving identically the same evidence, both offenses being alleged to
have occurred at the same time and place and differing only from the com-
panion case as to the defendant and the victim. Affirmed on the ground that
the error was injurious in theory only and not in fact.
LARCENY.
State v. Dobbins, Ia., 132 N. W. 8o5. Elements of Offense. Scheme to De-
fraud. Distinction from False Pretenses. Appeal from conviction on a charge
of larceny. The complainant was induced to pay over his money to a stakeholder
in a fraudulent horse-racing scheme, on the representation that he was not to
part with the title thereof, but only to deposit it with a stakeholder to induce
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
more betting by others, when in fact defendant and his confederates intended to
convert the money to their own use. Held, "that a felonious taking is necessary
to constitute larceny and that, generally speaking, a taking which is accomplished
with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious,
will be readily conceded, but where such consent is obtained by trick or fraud,
with promise to return the property after it has served some temporary use
or purpose, but with the secret intention on the part of the receiver to con-
vert it, then, as has already been said, the fraud supplies the place of trespass
in the taking and the offense committed is larceny. If this does not constitute
larceny, it will be, very difficult to frame any definition of that crime through
which a cunning thief may not find' an avenue of escape with his booty."
Affirmed.
PRESENCE OF DEFENDANT AFTEit TRIAL.
Fleming v. State, Fla., 56 So. 298. At Hearing on Motions in Arrest of
Judgment and for a New Trial. One of two possible interpretations of the
record was that the trial court refused to pass upon motions in arrest of
judgment and for a new trial because the defendant was not in court, though
he was represented by counsel. Held, the court may insist upon the personal
presence of the defendant, when practical. As there was no evidence that he
could not have been brought into court, and it was plainly evident that the
motion in arrest was without merit, the conviction was affirmed.
SELF-DEFENSE.
Taylor v. State, Ark., 139 S. W. 285. Duty to Retreat. The defendant
testified that in a controversy Cain called the defendant's wife a liar; defen-
dant then struck' him with his open hand; Cain began to draw a pistol from
under his vest; defendant shot him once, hesitated, and as Cain continued
to pull at his pistol defendant fired three more shots, as fast as he could,
and killed Cain. Held that by his own testimony he was guilty of manslaugh-
ter. He brought on the combat by striking Cain in the face, and could not
thereafter kill in self-defense until he had in good faith withdrawn from the
combat as far as he could, and done all in hig power to avoid the danger and
avert the necessity of killing. He made no attempt to show Cain that he
intended to withdraw, though a number of persons were present who might
have interfered to stop the combat if he had attempted to avoid it.
INDICTMENT 'AND INFORMATION.
SEDUcTION.
State v. Cotter, Ia., 132 N. V. 760. Corroboration Instructions. Appeal-
from a verdict of guilty on a charge of seduction. Held, that mere proof of
acquaintanceship between the principals, or opportunity to commit the crime,
or the fact that the prosecuting witness gave birth to an illegitimate child,'does
not constitute such corroboration of the prosecuting witness as is required to
justify a finding of guilt, and that where the fact of the birth of an illegitimate
child is in evidence, the defendant is entitled' to have the limits of its probative
value stated in an appropriate instruction. Reversed and remanded.
